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The relevance problem in the analysis of argumenta-
tive texts — A pragma-dialectical reconstruction
1.  The relevance problem
As for awkwardness, for researchers in Discourse Analysis, the rele-
vance problem is somewhat similar to the problem of alienation for
Marxists. The rationale of their joint venture is, as it were, to come to
terms with this problem; it is too fundamental and too general to be dealt
with definitively in one stroke. So, we will not try to do that, but restrict
ourselves to clarifying the relevance problem in the analysis of argumen-
tative texts containing oral or written argumentation in which an effort is
made to resolve a difference of opinion.1
First, we will quote some authors who have looked into the relevance
problem.
In her article, ‘On getting the point’ (1982), the American linguist
Tracy cites the following dialogue:
A: I don’t know what to major in.
B: uhm
A: I’m really torn between the practical and the interesting. I’d pro-
bably be able to get a good job if I majored in accounting (…).
But, I really like anthropology. It’s fun learning about all those
exotic cultures. But, look at Jim, he majored in anthropology in
college. Now Jim’s working in an office earning nothing.
B: Yeah, I ran into him the other day and we decided to play rac-
quetball (1982, 281-282).
According to empirical research, language users usually regard the
remark concerning racquetball as irrelevant when interpreting this dia-
logue. Tracy is interested in these kinds of empirical observations con-
cerning relevance. 
In their book Logical Self-defense (1983), the Canadian informal logi-
cians Johnson and Blair devote some space to relevance. They deal with
a woman’s reaction to the Report of the Bertrand Commission from
1 This is a first report on a joint research project called ‘Relevance in argumentative
discourse’ we are carrying out at the Netherlands Institute for Advanced Study (NIAS)
together with Douglas Walton.
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1981, in which the oil companies are accused of unlawful conspiracy in
order to freeze the prices of petrol. This lady wrote the following: 
Bertrand and the commissioners must be out to lunch. In no possible
way could he have one lousy shred of evidence to support their alle-
gations. I can say this because my husband has been working for the
oil company for 30 years and the company has always been good to
him. To say that the industry my husband works for has been ripping
off the public for years really irks me (1983, 177).
According to Johnson and Blair, the position of the lady stems from
her ‘egocentric investment’: her husband is an employee of an oil com-
pany, he has always been loyal to this company, and she is loyal to him.
Whether or not his employer has always been good to her husband does
not affect the question of the freezing of the oil prices. Therefore, John-
son and Blair accuse the lady of using an irrelevant argument. Johnson
and Blair are interested in making such judgements concerning rele-
vance.
These two examples, which can easily be augmented by examples
from other authors, make it clear that relevance is approached from vari-
ous angles and that there are rather different conceptions of relevance (or
irrelevance). An encompassing perspective that connects the various con-
ceptions is lacking. In our opinion, though, such a perspective should be
developed, as the various conceptions of relevance refer to related com-
ponents of text coherence, which represent different aspects of the rele-
vance-spectrum. Therefore, we think that it makes sense to maintain the
term relevance as a general term. In order to be able to do so in a respon-
sible way, we will start from some global features of relevance which
apply to all cases. 
Relevance (or lack of relevance) refers to the relation between explicit
or implicit parts of an oral or written text. Relevance (or lack of relevan-
ce) is tied to a certain objective: only in the light of this goal is the one
part of the text relevant or irrelevant to or with respect to the other. Rele-
vance (or lack of relevance) does not primarily refer to the formal rela-
tion between text fragments but to the functionality of the relation between
the communicative and interactional intentions which can be ascribed to
the language users who have put forward the text fragments concerned.2
2 Here, we must refrain from elaborating upon these points of  departure by precizating
the notion of functionality,  specifying the communicative and interactional intentions
which play a part and formally characterizing the relevance  relation between text frag-
ments.
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To put it briefly: one part of a text is relevant to the other if a relation
exists between these text fragments that is functional in light of a certain
objective. The general relevance problem, then, is to determine whether
or not such a functional relation exists between text fragments when
given a particular goal in a given case.
2. Divergent approaches to relevance
Differences in angles of approach lead to specific conceptualizations
of the idea of a ‘functional relation’, although the authors concerned usu-
ally do not, at least not explicitly, acknowledge that they are specific. In
the literature on relevance, a global distinction can be made between two
approaches.
First, there are authors who opt for an interpretative angle and who
have, in principle, a descriptive approach. This group counts linguisti-
cally and sociologically or psychologically oriented researchers such as
Tracy (1982), Dascal (1977), Jackson and Jacobs (1983), Sanders (1980),
Sperber and Wilson (1986) and Werth (1981). They place the relevance
problem, as a matter of course, into the context of the interpretation of
‘speech events’ and restrict the concept of relevance to interpretative
relevance.
Relevance problems dealt with in this framework are for instance ‘In
what way do the participants in a conversation determine what counts as
a relevant sequel to what has been said before?’ and ‘When can utterance
A be interpreted as a relevant reaction or a relevant sequel to utterance B,
e.g. as the granting or rejection of a request or as an answer to a ques-
tion?’
The extract quoted from Tracy about playing racquetball is a clear
illustration of interpretative irrelevance.
Second, there are authors who opt for an evaluative angle and who
have, in principle, a normative approach. Logically oriented researchers,
be it formal or informal logicians, such as Johnson and Blair (1983),
Govier (1985), Iseminger (1986), Schlesinger (1986) and the representa-
tives of the so-called standard treatment of fallacies belong to this group.
They place the relevance problem without any ado in the context of the
evaluation of arguments and restrict the concept of relevance to evalua-
tive relevance.
Relevance problems which are dealt with in this framework are, for
instance, ‘Should a personal attack, an appeal to authority, an appeal to
pity, threatening with sanctions or pointing at the consequences of a
standpoint in an argument always be rejected as irrelevant?’
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The extract quoted from Johnson and Blair about the woman who put
forward an irrelevant argument about the freezing of the petrol prices is a
clear illustration of evaluative irrelevance.
It is characteristic of both aproaches that the concept of relevance is
simply being monopolized, without taking into account that by doing so,
the relevance problem is seriously limited, whereas the necessary connec-
tion between interpretation and evaluation is neglected. The two ap-
proaches of relevance will diverge more and more — and never the twain
shall meet.
3. The analysis of texts
Normally, language use is aimed at understanding as well as accep-
tance: someone who makes a request not only wants it to be understood
that he has requested something, but he also wants his request to be gran-
ted; someone who explains something not only wants his explanation to
be understood but he also wants his explanation to be accepted, et cetera.
Irrespective of whether it concerns short stretches of discourse or large
texts, the interpretation always anticipates an evaluation, and the evalua-
tion always presupposes an interpretation. As a consequence, scholars of
discourse must envisage how the descriptive and the normative approach
to texts can be linked with each other in such a way that the diverging
angles converge.
In order to be able to deal adequately with more complex discourse,
such as most argumentative texts, an analysis of the discourse that pro-
vides a sensible connection between the interpretation and the evaluation
has to take place. A sound evaluation requires that the right evaluative
questions are being asked, and in order to make this happen sys-
tematically, the interpretation, as a rule, has to undergo certain analytic
transformations.
Analysing a text means looking at the text that is interpreted by the
listener or reader from a specific viewpoint ensuing from the objective of
the analysis. The analyst views the textual reality as it were with the help
of a special pair of spectacles which makes the particular aspects which
he is interested in more visible. He focusses on certain phenomena, so
that he gets a better picture of some things, whereas other things fade
away or disappear, more or less like in an X-ray. Starting from the inter-
pretation, he thus achieves an analytical overview that can serve as point
of departure for the evaluation.
Depending on the objective of the analysis, different kinds of analyses
that also require different kinds of spectacles may be necessary. An ana-
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lysis aimed at revealing emotional tensions, for instance, may require
psycho-analytical spectacles; an analysis aimed at detecting means of
persuasion, rhetorical spectacles, et cetera. Because the psychoanalyst
has other interests than a rhetorician, his analysis must be based on an-
other theoretical model than that of the rhetorician. The Freudian model
will be more suitable to him than a persuasion model.
First of all, of course, an appropriate theoretical model must be
available for the analysis. Otherwise, it is no use to attempt an analysis
and, for that matter, it will be very hard to execute. In order to be able to
reveal the points which are of consequence for the evaluation, the analyst
must have recourse to an ideal model that enables him to distinguish
between what is relevant in the light of the goal concerned and what is
not. For this, the ideal model must be explicitly formulated and theoreti-
cally accounted for.
4. A pragma-dialectical reconstruction of argumentative texts
When analysing argumentative discourse, we employ the pragma-
dialectical model, which makes it possible to identify the crucial moves.
Argumentative discourse is, then, considered to be part of a critical dis-
cussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion — this is the dialecti-
cal point. According to the model, a critical discussion proceeds in four
stages: in the confrontation stage, the difference of opinion is defined; in
the opening stage, the starting-points for resolving the difference are
identified; in the argumentation stage, pro- and contra-argumentation is
advanced to resolve the difference; in the concluding stage, the outcome
of the discussion is established. The ideal model indicates which types of
speech acts can, at each of these stages, contribute to the resolution of the
difference of opinion — this is the pragmatic point (van Eemeren and
Grootendorst 1984, 1987).
Normally, not all four stages of a critical discussion are explicitly and
completely represented in this order in an argumentative text; and also
speech acts are performed which are not included in the ideal model or
whose function is not immediately clear. Therefore, at first glance, irrele-
vance seems to prevail, but at second glance this need not be so. The ana-
lysis is aimed at determining the dialectical relevance calibre of an
argumentative text by verifying to what extent it can be reconstructed as
a critical discussion. If there is reason enough to do so in a cyclic process
of analysis, one or more transformations are carried out which separate
the relevant elements from the “genuinely” irrelevant ones (van Eemeren
1986).
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In this way, in an analytic overview all those, and only those, elements
are systematically brought together which are functional in view of the
dialectical objective. In order to be able to do this, however, some clarifi-
cation is needed of the problem of dialectical relevance.
5. Differentiation of the problem of dialectical relevance
No relation of relevance exists between sentences which are put to-
gether at random, but in ordinary language use this situation will hardly
ever occur. Verbal communication and interaction do not take place by
means of individual sentences but by means of inter-related speech acts
by which the speaker or writer tries to achieve certain communicative
and interactional effects on the listener or reader, and which can be more
or less complex. In case of problems of interpretative relevance, the lis-
tener or reader will almost automatically try to find a goal that puts the
one speech act in a functional relation to the other — and, as a rule, he
will easily succeed in this, even if with sentences whose occurrence on
the same piece of paper is only coincidental.
In a pragma-dialectical analysis, relevance connections are also sought
for, but in a calculated and systematic way: in view of the specific insight
that the analysis must provide, the interpretation is, as it were, programmed
by putting the text fragment to be analysed into the perspective of the
resolving of differences of opinion, and then by checking whether the
speech acts that are performed are functional within this framework. In
doing this, the ideal model of a critical discussion serves as a guideline.
According to the ideal model, not all speech acts are functional at every
stage of the process of resolving a difference of opinion: their relevance
is linked to a specific stage in the resolving process and to the specific
(sub) goal that is aimed for in that stage. Lack of functionality of a speech
act may have to do with the particular stage at which it is performed.
When dealing with the problem of dialectical relevance, a specification is
required of the exact domain in which the speech act under consideration
is relevant. Furthermore, the object of dialectical relevance must be spe-
cified. The functionality of a speech act need not be questionable on all
points: the issue may be limited to a certain component of it. A specifica-
tion is required of the exact aspect of the speech act whose relevance is at
stake. Finally, lack of functionality of a speech act may be of various
sorts. This means that a specification is also needed of the exact nature of
the relevance being referred to.
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With the help of the pragma-dialectical theory, the notion of dialectical
relevance can be differentiated along these three dimensions: the domain
dimension, the object dimension and the nature dimension.3
The central question with regard to the domain dimension is what
range the relevance has. Depending on the range, various contexts of
relevance can be distinguished in this dimension, such as opening stage
relevance, concluding stage relevance, and, if the whole speech event is
involved, overall relevance. For example, analytical observations can be
made concerning the relevance of a speech act in the argumentation
stage.
The central question with regard to the object dimension is of which
component of the speech event the relevance is being considered. Depen-
ding on the component involved, various aspects of relevance can be
distinguished in this dimension, such as the relevance of propositions and
the relevance of communicative forces. For example, analytical observa-
tions can be made concerning the relevance of a certain proposition in
the argumentation stage.
The central question with regard to the nature dimension is what kind
of relevance is at stake. Depending on the sort of relevance involved,
various types of relevance can be distinguished in this dimension, such as
order relevance, clarity relevance, completeness relevance and reliability
relevance. For example, analytical observations can be made concerning
the completeness relevance of propositions in the argumentation stage.
It may be worth noting that, unlike Grice, we think that the scope of
the relevance problem is not restricted to the maxim of relation. For
example, saying too much (which amounts to a violation of the maxim of
quantity) leads to another type of relevance problem, as is reflected in
ordinary language use when people talk about irrelevant repetitions et
cetera. We think that in dealing with relevance, all four Gricean conver-
sational maxims (or their equivalents in some other theoretical frame-
work) should be taken into account, and problems of relevance play a
part in all four categories. So, on the one hand, we agree with Sperber
and Wilson and other critics of Grice that relevance not only pertains to
3 In our opinion, when dealing with relevance problems, these three dimensions always
play a part. However, their implementation depends on the theoretical starting-point
sensuing from the perspective deemed to be the mostappropriate for dealing with a par-
ticular sort of speech event or text genre. Here, we have restricted ourselves toproviding
a pragma-dialectical implementation for argumentative discourse and texts.
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the maxim of relation, and that a more encompassing conception of rele-
vance is needed, but, on the other hand, we do not think that the maxim
of relation can be skipped, and we do not agree with Sperber and Wilson
that Grice’s maxims can be replaced by a single principle of relevance
(1981, 170). 
The various combinations of aspects, contexts, and types of relevance
can be represented in a dialectical relevance cube, with one co-ordinate
level representing the object dimension, another co-ordinate level for the
domain dimension and the third co-ordinate level for the nature dimen-
sion.
With the help of this specification, the problem of dialectical relevan-
ce can be differentiated, and each problem of dialectical relevance can be
characterized in a well-grounded, consistent and clear manner. In this
way, various categories of dialectical relevance problems can be distin-
guished, so that in the analysis, the most appropriate approach can be
selected for dealing with the relevance problems at stake.
6. An exemplary pragma-dialectical reconstruction
In order to illustrate how in a pragma-dialectical reconstruction the
problems arising in analysing argumentative discourse as part of a criti-
cal discussion can be dealt with, it might be enlightening to start from an
arbitrarily chosen argumentative text.
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Suppose someone says to somebody else:
Must we move this thing any further? Or would
you rather leave it here?
Probably, an ordinary language user will not see any problem here:
two questions are asked with respect to the intentions of the person being
addressed, and the second question offers an alternative to the possibility
suggested in the first question. The matter becomes less clear, however,
if more information is supplied concerning the context in which these
questions have been asked. The extract is taken from a conversation
between two people who are moving a piano: a mover and his assistant.
The mover, who has just been quoted, knows that the piano should go to
the second floor. They have reached the first floor and the young hand
has just said:
We will never get that piano to the second floor.
God knows why that woman wants it there. Let’s
have a fag.
It is clear now that the initial interpretation can hardly be maintained.
So, then, what is the point of the mover’s questions? We have a relevance
problem here which must be dealt with in the analysis.
In doing this, we make use of the pragma-dialectical ideal model, with
the distribution of speech acts over the various discussion stages. In view
of the fact that they have only got to the first floor and that it is clear to
the mover that the piano has to go to the second floor, the question ‘Must
we move this thing any further?’ cannot be a real question and the ques-
tion ‘Or would you rather leave it here?’ cannot refer to a genuine alter-
native.
After his colleague’s remark that it is an impossible job and after his
eagerness to have a break, there is reason to assume that by asking ‘Must
we move this thing any further?’, the mover is confronting his colleague
who shows signs of wanting to chuck it in. Therefore, it is justified to
check whether this question can also be reconstructed as expressing a
standpoint, so that it may be analysed as part of the confrontation stage
of an emerging critical discussion. In that case, it might also be sensible
to check if his second question, ‘Or would you rather leave it here?’, can-
not be part of the argumentation stage, because in ordinary conversation,
confrontation, as a rule, leads to an argumentative ‘repair’ (van Eemeren
1987 and Jackson and Jacobs 1983).  
After the ideal model of a critical discussion has thus fulfilled a
heuristic function in the analysis of the organization in stages, provisional
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characterisations can be given of the types of relevance which are at
stake here. According to the analysis, the first question would be a rhe-
torical question that functions indirectly as a standpoint in the confronta-
tion stage:
(In my opinion) That piano must be moved further 
and the second question would be a rhetorical question that functions
indirectly as an argument in the argumentation stage:
(For) You cannot leave it here
This means that the apparent irrelevances in these cases are of the fol-
lowing types: clarity irrelevance of the communicative force in the con-
frontation stage, and clarity irrelevance of the communicative force in
the argumentation stage, respectively.
These characterisations, however, are only justified if it is justified in
both cases to reconstruct these text fragments dialectically, by means of
the substitution transformation, so that the lack of clarity is being re-
moved and the apparent irrelevant questions can be replaced by a stand-
point and an argument, respectively. Of course, the mere fact that the
model indicates that something might be the case does not prove that it
really is the case — otherwise, anything could be reconstructed as rele-
vant. That the two questions may indeed be reconstructed as a standpoint
and an argument should be accounted for in the analysis.
For brevity’s sake, in showing how this can be done, we restrict our-
selves to the second question. In the reconstruction of the question ‘Or
would you rather leave it here?’ as an argument, among other things, the
insight plays a part that because of the general Communication Principle
in the absence of a good reason for doing so, no pointless, superfluous,
insincere, incomprehensible or non-fitting speech acts may be ascribed to
language users. If taken literally, the mover’s question ‘Or would you
rather leave it here?’ would be superfluous (because the mover knows
that the piano cannot be left on the first floor), but there is no good rea-
son for assuming that he abandons the Communication Principle altoge-
ther. All the same, he would violate the preparatory condition for asking
a question, namely that the questioner does not yet know the answer.
Therefore, it should be checked if he may have some intention other than
asking a question.
The violation of the superfluity rule which takes place if the mover
asks for the sake of asking, has been redressed if his question is taken to
be an assertion. Then, he has asked a rhetorical question in which he has
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in fact made an assertion, so that he still observes the Communication
Principle. Obviously, this assertion is not superfluous, for it seems not to
have sunk in with the assistant that it is definitely the case that the piano
must be moved to the second floor. 
However, because the Communication Principle also implies that
there should be a fitting relation between consecutive speech acts, it is
necessary to check whether this reconstruction provides such a relation.
In doing this, the correctness conditions for the performance of speech
acts can be used again. Earlier on, the mover who asks the question has
put forward a standpoint which he may assume to be doubted by the
addressee. This means that a condition for accepting this standpoint has
not been fulfilled. By means of his second question ‘Or would you rather
leave it here?’, the mover now tries to make clear (in an ironic manner)
that the correctness conditions for the standpoint that the piano must be
moved further are actually fulfilled. This implies that this second ques-
tion should not merely be reconstructed as an assertion, but also as an
argument for the standpoint that the piano must be moved further. For a
correct performance of the speech act of putting forward the standpoint
that something must be moved, the preparatory condition has to be ful-
filled which is that there is a good reason to move it. By means of his
assertion in the form of a rhetorical question, which is to be analysed as
an argument, the mover indicates that this condition has been fulfilled
and thus tries to overcome any doubts about it. In this way, the second
question is analysed as an argumentative ‘repair’ aimed at resolving the
brewing difference of opinion about the moving of the piano, or preven-
ting it from becoming a real issue.
In a similar way, an account can be given for the reconstruction of the
first question of the mover, ‘Must we move this thing any further?’, as an
assertion which serves as a standpoint. In both cases, the reconstruction
amounts to carrying out a substitution transformation that, in this context,
remedies the apparent irrelevance, as a consequence of unclarity, of the
communicative force.
Herewith, we have illustrated, for one type of relevance problem, how
problems of analysis can be dealt with by a pragma-dialectical approach.
Similar reconstructions can be made for problems of analysis concerning
other categories of relevance. In this way, an adequate point of departure
is created for the evaluation. When such an evaluation is carried out, a
question that seemed interpretatively irrelevant, may prove to be analyti-
cally relevant because it serves as an argument, but evaluatively irrele-
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vant because this argument is a fallacy in which an unwarranted appeal is
made to authority. Of course, much more remains to be said about this
subject, but in this paper we only wanted to show how a pragma-dialecti-
cal reconstruction can provide an analysis of an argumentative text that
can serve as an intermediary between the interpretation and the evalua-
tion of argumentative discourse when dealing with the relevance problem.
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